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No other space operations in the 21 st century more comprehensively embody the 
challenges and dependencies of interoperability than EVA. This discipline is already 
functioning at an W1paralleled level of interagency, inter-organizational and international 
cooperation. This trend will only increase as space programs endeavor to expand in the 
face of shrinking budgets. 
Among the topics examined in this paper are hardware-oriented issues. Differences in 
design standards among various space participants dictate differences in the EVA tools that 
must be manufactured, flown and maintained on-orbit. Presently only two types of 
functional space suits exist in the world. However, three versions of functional airlocks are 
in operation. Of the three airlocks, only the International Space Station (ISS) Joint Airlock 
can accommodate both types of suits. Due to functional differences in the suits, 
completely different operating protocols are required for each. Should additional space 
suit or airlock designs become available, the complexity will increase. The lessons learned 
as a result of designing and operating within such a system are explored. 
This paper also examines the non-hardware challenges presented by interoperability for a 
discipline that is as uniquely dependent upon the individual as EVA. Operation of space 
suits (essentially single-person spacecrafts) by persons whose native language is not that of 
the suits' designers is explored. The intricacies of shared mission planning, shared control 
and shared execution of joint EVA's are explained. For example, once ISS is fully 
functional, the potential exists for two crewmembers of different nationality to be wearing 
suits manufactured and controlled by a third nation, while operating within an airlock 
manufactured and controlled by a fourth nation, in an effort to perform tasks upon 
hardware belonging to a fifth nation. Everything from training issues, to procedures 
development and writing, to real-time operations is addressed. 
Finally, this paper looks to the management challenges presented by interoperability in 
general. With budgets being reduced among all space-faring nations, the need to expand 
cooperation in the highly expensive field of human space operations is only going to 
intensify. The question facing management is not if the trend toward interoperation will 
continue, but how to best facilitate its doing so. Real-world EVA interoperability 
experience throughout the ShuttlelMir and ISS Programs is discussed to illustrate the 
challenges and illuminate the potential pitfalls present for any technical discipline facing 
this trend of 21 st century space operations. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20110011511 2019-08-30T15:40:15+00:00Z
Interoperability Trends in Extravehicular Activity 
(EVA) Space Operations for the 21 st Century 
Gerald E. Miller, Manager, EVA Operations, United Space Alliance 
Introduction 
Extravehicular Activity (EV A) is the 
space operations discipline providing the 
most tangible, visceral experience of 
human space exploration. During 
EVA's, humans are sent into the vacuum 
of space to perform those tasks that 
presently can only be performed by 
human hands, coupled with human senses 
and intellect. It is this very human nature 
of EVA that drives its need for 
interoperability as space operations 
expand in the 21 sl century. 
Throughout the Shuttle-Mir Program and 
now in the International Space Station 
(ISS) Program, EVA has led the way in 
demonstrating interoperability. No other 
space operations discipline has been so 
deeply integrated between foreign 
partners. These experiences have proven 
that the economic and technological 
realities of human space flight are 
dictating for any space-faring entities 
(whether nations, agencies or companies) 
to succeed in expanding peoples' 
presence beyond Earth, interoperability is 
the trend. 
As all space organizations struggle to 
expand their programs, even as their 
budgets are reduced, this will only 
continue to be truer. 
Hardware Issues 
The most obvious sources of 
interoperability requirements are 
differences in hardware. Even though 
equipment and tools have been designed 
to perform precisely the same jobs, in 
precisely the same environments, 
differences in operations philosophies 
lead to very different design solutions. 
The Russian and U.S. space suits (Orlan 
and Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU), 
respectively) were both designed to 
sustain human life in the environment of 
space, while providing the wearer the 
ability to perform manual tasks. 
However, while the two suits may look 
similar on the outside, differences in 
underlying operational approaches have 
led to very different systems. 
Neither is "better" or "worse" than the 
other. They simply were designed to 
fulfill different objectives. The resultant 
operational differences, which flow 
outward from these initial design 
differences like rivers subdividing into 
multiple streams, permeate virtually 
every aspect of hardware used for EV A. 
Russia's Orlan suit was designed to 
accommodate a corps of cosmonauts with 
a very narrow limit on allowable size 
range. This allowed the Orlan to be built 
as a "one-size-fits-all" unit. It is a single 
piece with minimal re-sizing capabilities 
in the arms and legs. This greatly 
simplifies on-orbit maintenance, but also 
limits suit use to fewer people. 
The US.'s EMU was designed to 
accommodate individuals ranging in size 
from the 5th percentile Asian female, to 
the 95 th percentile Caucasian male. In 
order to meet this requirement, a "one-
size-fits-all" design was impossible. 
Multiple-sized components (medium, 
large and extra-large) and sets of sizing 
rings are needed to individually build up 
an EMU. Not only does this complicate 
on-orbit and ground maintenance, but 
flight manifesting and logistics must now 
consider the various sizes of crew and 
when each is scheduled to fly when 
processing flight hardware. The trade-off 
is that most people can be fitted to use the 
US. suit. 
In order for the US. and Russia to 
combine their EVA expertise and 
capabilities, their differences had to be 
assimilated into one another's operations. 
The two systems had to become 
interoperable. As the consequences of 
these fundamental design decisions 
flowed outward, derived requirements 
resulted in an ever-widening set of 
hardware challenges to this 
interoperabili ty. 
Aside from the sizing differences in the 
two suits' hardware, functional variations 
had to be overcome. While both suits 
function perfectly well at vacuum, it is 
not physically possible for the EMU and 
Orlan to go to vacuum simultaneously in 
the same airlock. 
Russia's Orlan was developed with a 
concept of centralized control of airlock 
and suit life support parameters. During 
airlock operations, the Orlan's systems 
are integrated via umbilici into those of 
the airlock. One individual controls the 
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in-suit life support and airlock for both 
people in Orlans. 
The operational philosophy of the U.S. 
EMU is based upon individual control. 
While umbilici are used as access to 
consumables (oxygen, power and water) 
during airlock operations, all mechanical 
functions are under control of the 
individual wearing the suit. 
Thus, in developing interoperability 
between the US. and Russian EVA 
systems, a new airlock was required. The 
Joint Airlock onboard ISS can 
accommodate either the Orlan or EMU 
by changing out control panels in the 
airlock. 
The resultant interoperability provides a 
more robust EVA capability for the 
station. Depending on the tasks required, 
suit familiarity, consumables 
conservation or suit failure contingencies, 
the ISS Joint Airlock can be used for 
space walks by crewmembers wearing 
either suit. As derived requirements for 
interoperability propagate further 
outward from differing suit design 
philosophies, hardware outside the 
airlock becomes affected. 
Because EMU's make use of custom 
gloves to accommodate individual 
crewmembers, higher dexterity is 
possible. Differing hand dexterities 
between suits mean when a common 
tether hook (for use by either suit) was 
required, significant design challenges 
arose. 
Adding to the dexterity challenges are 
differences between handrail (where 
hooks are attached) specifications of 
Russia and the US. By the time 
differences in reach, access, visibility, 
stowage locations on the two suits and 
varying load limits are factored in, a 
seemingly simple redesign of common 
tether hooks becomes a significant 
engineering challenge. 
Identical considerations propagate into 
designs for every piece of hardware that 
is used interoperably. But hardware 
differences affect more than just other 
hardware. Hardware differences also 
affect people. 
With two types of functional space suits 
and three separate functioning airlocks 
(only one of which accommodates both 
suits), plus hundreds of EVA hand tools 
in use, the requirements on instructor, 
crew and flight controller certification 
training are enormous. For personnel to 
be interoperable using such a wide 
variety of hardware requires several 
thousand hours of initial certification 
training and follow-on proficiency work. 
The lessons learned by designing and 
operating within such a blended hardware 
system demonstrate that added 
capabilities can be realized when 
differing systems are made interoperable. 
However, such benefits come with a cost 
to both hardware and personnel. 
Managing the costlbenefit ratio of 
interoperability in light of hardware 
issues is a significant factor in this trend 
of space operations. 
Non-Hardware Issues 
Another significant factor in the trend 
toward EV A interoperability is the effect 
of non-hardware issues. 
No other space operations discipline is so 
uniquely dependent upon the individual 
as EVA. Even when crewmembers are 
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from the same country, trained on exactly 
the same hardware, by precisely the same 
instructor, to perform the exact same 
tasks, they will have different results. 
This is because no two individuals are 
anthropometrically identical. They do 
not have the exact same span of reach, 
nor identical range of motion, nor 
precisely matching upper body strength, 
nor ankle flexibility, nor mechanical 
aptitude, nor manual dexterity, nor 
height, etc. When the new 
interoperability variables of non-native 
languages, training facilities on separate 
continents, different task development 
philosophies, etc. are added, the scale of 
non-hardware hurdles comes into focus. 
An inescapable element affecting EVA 
interoperability is language. When 
people are wearing a space suit during 
EV A, they are for all practical purposes 
operating a single-person spacecraft. 
Virtually all major subsystems of a 
spacecraft (closed-loop life support 
system, active cooling/heating system, 
on-board computer, electrical system, 
caution-and-warning system, 
communications, propulsion system, etc.) 
are incorporated into space suits. 
The mechanisms for controlling these 
systems, both on the ground and in orbit, 
are created in the language of their 
developers. Simultaneously, supporting 
documentation (hardware specifications, 
training manuals, drawings/schematics, 
systems handbooks, etc.) is also printed 
in the hardware owners ' language. 
The effects of such a reality upon 
interoperability go far beyond the 
inconvenience and expense of translating 
documents. Though even these 
considerations are not insignificant for 
training and certification purposes. 
As discussed, during an EVA the suited 
crewmember is operating a single-person 
space vehicle, while performing manual 
tasks. These suits are their soul source of 
life support while outside. In periods of 
nominal operations, the crewmembers' 
and ground controllers' fluency in a non-
native language are less important. 
However, in emergency situations it 
becomes much more significant if there 
are language barriers present. These 
barriers may exist between crewmembers 
or between a crewmember and the 
hardware being used. They may exist 
between the ground controllers and on-
orbit crew. There can also be language 
barriers between ground controllers. 
Interoperability multiplies the number of 
places where language differences can 
create difficulties. Other non-hardware 
difficulties of interoperability are 
encountered under the umbrella of what 
is generally labeled Mission Operations. 
Mission Operations encompass all the 
work necessary to plan/integrate, train 
(ground and flight crews) and fly 
(execute) an EVA. Mission Ops are the 
source of extensive challenges for 
interoperability. This is demonstrated 
very clearly by ISS. 
During the planning phase of an 
interoperable EVA for ISS, Mission Ops 
personnel must integrate requirements 
from numerous foreign and domestic 
sources. For example, Russian and 
American crewmembers might be 
operating u.S.-manufactured suits while 
performing EVA tasks on the Canadian-
manufactured robotic arm. 
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Such an EV A, which is not at all unusual 
aboard ISS, demands interoperable 
planning and integration to resolve 
task/procedures responsibility, timeline 
development issues, integration of the 
event into overall ISS operations, 
establishment of Flight Rules, etc. 
Coordination ofthis pre-mission planning 
and integration becomes complex. 
To minimize this complexity, the EVA 
Mission Ops personnel for ISS have 
implemented interoperability under the 
following general guideline. Lead 
responsibility for EVA planning and 
integration lies with the organization 
whose suit is being used. 
This is because expertise for telemetry 
moni toring/interpretation and 
command/control authority for these life 
support systems resides with the 
organization that created them. Since 
control of EVA events is under the 
authority of this organization, it holds the 
lead responsibility for planning and 
integration of the space walk. 
Once an interoperable EVA has been 
planned, it must be trained. In this phase, 
the lead organization has two primary 
training responsibilities, training 
operation of the suit and training the 
EV A tasks to be performed. 
In training suit operations, the lead 
organization functions virtually 
autonomously. As developers of the suits 
to be used, they retain ultimate expertise 
on the requirements to operate it. 
However, in training the EV A tasks to be 
performed, the lead organization must be 
interoperable. In the example sited, 
while the task will be trained by U.S. 
instructors, technical expertise for the 
task lies with Canadians. The instructors 
must interact heavily with the hardware 
experts to develop and train procedures 
that fulfill technical objectives, while 
adhering to EVA operational (airlock, 
vehicle and suit) constraints. 
The final phase of Mission Operations, 
execution, is also heavily impacted by 
interoperability. Following planning and 
training of an EVA, it is executed by the 
on-orbit crew under the direction of flight 
controllers on the ground. 
In the example being discussed, 
command and control of the suits, airlock 
and task will be performed from Mission 
Control Center-Houston (MCC-H) with 
augmented flight control support by 
Canadian robotics experts. However, 
interoperability yields the possibility for a 
more complex EVA execution scenario 
aboard ISS . 
Simply changing the choice of which suit 
is used in the present example presents 
increased challenges for interoperability. 
Should the capability be enabled for the 
same crewmembers to use the Russian 
Orlan suit in the U.S. Joint Airlock, it 
would become necessary to hand off 
control authority between MCC-H and 
Mission Control Center-Moscow (MCC-
M) during the EVA. 
The reason such a hand-off would be 
required is that expertise for the Joint 
Airlock resides with the U.S., while 
expertise for the Orlan resides with 
Russia. Airlock systems issues during its 
operation would be controlled by MCC-
H. However, once the crew egresses the 
airlock, MCC-M would control the EVA 
tasks. In this circumstance, Canadian 
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expertise may be required to augment 
Flight Controllers in both locations. 
A matrix created in 1999 delineating the 
complexities ofISS EVA interoperability 
for Mission Operations is displayed in 
Figure-I. Clearly the issues affecting 
EVA interoperability include significant 
non-hardware considerations. 
Management Issues 
Technical issues, both hardware and non-
hardware, are not the only ones 
demanding consideration for EV A 
interoperability. In fact, for the 21 51 
century, EV A is not the only space 
operations discipline that must face 
questions of interoperability. 
Management within space-faring 
organizations is challenged by both 
decreasing budgets and increasing 
complexity of human space flight to 
consider interoperability in general in 
order to meet their objectives. This 
means management must develop 
methods to effectively expand 
international and interagency cooperation 
if human space exploration is to thrive in 
the 21 51 century. The key term here is 
effectively. 
Interoperability lessons learned during 
the ShuttlelMir Program, and those being 
learned onboard ISS, must be applied 
when mapping future space endeavors. 
EVA, being the most heavily integrated 
space operation, is an outstanding source 
of interoperability lessons which can 
illuminate potential pitfalls facing other 
disciplines. 
For example, examining the downstream 
consequences (both financial and 
technical) of suit design decisions upon 
crew assignments and hardware 
logistics/processing illustrates previously 
unforeseen factors impacting 
management's schedules and budgets. 
Seemingly minor choices made early in 
development of interoperable systems 
can lead to far-reaching operational 
Issues. 
Another EVA interoperability experience 
from the ShuttlelMir and ISS Programs 
with applicability across other disciplines 
is personnel training and certification. If 
interoperability is achieved by simply 
increasing the number of systems 
simultaneously in use, the requirements 
for ground and flight personnel to 
achieve and maintain operational 
proficiency will soon become unwieldy. 
Management must scrutinize the 
cost/benefit ratio (not only financial, but 
also in terms of logistics and practicality) 
as it applies to the people who must 
operate such a system. 
Management must apply this same level 
of scrutiny when considering real-time 
mission execution using an interoperable 
system. Decisions about the division of 
responsibilities and authority have a 
profound impact on mission safety, as 
well as mission success. This is 
particularly true in off-nominal or 
emergency situations when consequences 
of operations are most critical. 
As humans strive to increase their 
presence in space throughout the 21 sl 
century, the technological and economic 
hurdles they must overcome are 
increasing correspondingly. The next 
steps by humans beyond their own planet 
will require investments that are as 
demanding fmancially as they are 
intellectually. 
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It is virtually assured that meeting such 
demands will require agencies, 
organizations, institutions, corporations 
and nations to pool their collective 
resources . The team that has effectively 
learned the lessons and facilitated its 
implementation will meet the inevitable 
need for interoperability in space 
operations for the 21 sl century. 
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Figure-l 
ISS EVA Interoperability Matrix 
March 2, 1999 
MATRIX VARIABLES: SUIT - E (EMU)/O (ORLAN) 
COMBI-
NATIONS 
ErJ/S 
EuJ/S 
OrJ/R 
OuJ/R 
PROCEDURES, TIMELIINE AND TRAINING - u (U.S.)/r (Russia) 
AIRLOCK - J (Joint)lR (Russian)/S(Shuttle) 
DEVELOPMENT/TRAINING REAL-TIME SCHEDULED LANGUAGE 
(responsible location) CONTROL TO OCCUR? IN USE 
sys-U.S./task-Russia sys-Houstonltask-Moscow yes AIL ops-Englpost egress-Rus 
U.S. Houston yes Eng 
JAIL sys-U.S. JAIL sys-Houston Rus 
task, RAIL & suit sys- Russia task, RAIL & sys-Moscow yes 
task & JAIL sys-U.S task & JAIL sys-Houston AIL ops-Rus/post egress-Eng 
suit & RAIL sys-Russia suit & RAIL sys-Moscow yes 
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